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In pursuit of the long-term goal of developing a general theory of humour, it is reasonable to study certain limited forms
of humorous artefact in detail. One obvious class of humour to consider is verbally expressed humour, and in particular
jokes. We propose a methodology for exploring this subarea. The central idea is to devise detailed symbolic descriptions
of the internal linguistic structure of classes of jokes, at a suitable level of abstraction. These descriptions are intended
to make explicit the semantic and pragmatic factors (broadly interpreted) that are relevant to the humorous effect of the
subclass of joke in question, and also to contribute an accumulation of analysed data over which more general theorising
may occur. An analogy is drawn with established practice in linguistics.
1 Motivation
The ability to comprehend, appreciate and produce hu-
morous artefacts such as jokes is central to human cul-
ture and social interaction, and hence the area of humour
(including both humorous activities and the artefacts in-
volved) merits scientific study. Exploring humorous activ-
ity and objects in rigorous detail may throw light on (and
interact with the study of) a variety of aspects of human
behaviour, such as cognition, physiology, social conven-
tions, means of communication. Artificial intelligence is
well placed to pursue such an enquiry, as its methodolo-
gies and techniques have been developed to assist with
the detailed symbolic modelling of complex human beha-
viour. The work here is an attempt to lay the foundations
of such an investigation.
Although there is no accepted theory of humour, there
have been numerous observations and proposals regard-
ing the nature of humour, and these are often clustered
into a tripartite division ofincongruity, superiority, and
relief “theories” (Raskin, 1985). Attardo (1994) general-
ises these labels tocognitive, social, andpsychoanalytical
(Figure 1). Another perspective would be to say that cog-
nitive/incongruity approaches concentrate on the humor-
ousstimulus, social/hostility approaches consider thein-
terpersonaleffects, and psychoanalytical/relief proposals
emphasise theaudience’s reaction. All of these are inter-
esting and valid, but distinct, aspects of the phenomenon
of humour. If we are develop a complete theory of hu-
mour and its use, all of these facets must be considered.








Figure 1: Types of “theory” (Attardo, 1994)
of the types of humorous stimulus that exist, how they are
structured and how they function. It is this question –
the nature of the stimulus – that is addressed here. This
does not constitute a complete theory of humour, but it
is certainly a necessary step towards a full investigation,
since it would be difficult to seek empirical support for
a theory of humour use without some properly detailed
analysis of the data. If we are, for example, to find cor-
relations between types of stimuli and human reactions,
then we require an account of the stimuli, to structure and
guide our experimentation. The work here makes a start
on dissecting the humorous stimuli, in one particular sub-
area of humour, namelyverbally expressedhumour. The
termverbal humour(Raskin, 1985) is avoided here, as it
is sometimes used in a narrower sense, roughly denoting
plays on words (Attardo, 1994).
That is, the focus is restricted to humour conveyed
in language, as opposed to physical or visual humour,
but not necessarily playing on the form of the language.
This restriction makes the task slightly more manageable,
while still leaving a wide and rich range of phenomena to
be considered.
A further simplification is choosing to study individual
jokesin isolation from the context of use or the speaker/hearer
involved. (Jokes could be loosely defined as short texts
deliberately designed to elicit humorous response, often
in a manner unrelated to a specific context; however, noth-
ing here depends on having an initial definition of jokes
in general.) Starting by tackling jokes out of context does
not embody a claim that humorous effects are not depend-
ent on factors such as context, personal opinions, and cul-
ture. Rather, it is an attempt to make some progress by
(at least initially) not attempting to study simultaneously
all the factors involved in a complex phenomenon. There
is also a deliberate claim here that there will be regular-
ities in the stimuli involved in humour (the joke texts)
which should be documented and described before we can
proceed to correlate these with anything else, or to de-
vise more elaborate hypotheses about the whole humour
mechanism. This is again analogous to descriptive lin-
guistics, in which there has been a great deal of effort de-
voted to analysing the structural properties ofsentences,
which are in a sense the counterpart of jokes here. The
hope is that if we can develop a good account of how jokes
operate, then we can proceed to apply a similar methodo-
logy to other forms of verbally expressed humour.
It is important to note at the outset that this paper does
not propose a theory of humour, not even of verbally ex-
pressed humour, nor even of jokes. What it does is to
outline a methodology for approaching the construction
of a theory of jokes, thence a theory of verbally expressed
humour, and eventually a theory of humour. Of course,
any methodological approach implicitly embodies some
theoretical hypotheses, but the assumptions adopted here
are relatively minimal (see Section 12 below).
2 Description and theory
If we are to develop a general theory of verbally expressed
humour, it must be based on data. However, it is not
feasible to proceed from raw data (e.g. a large and unana-
lysed collection of jokes) to a complete theory in one step.
Some preliminary analysis of the data is required first.
An analogy can be made here with generative linguist-
ics, where (within the Chomskyan paradigm at least) there
is a quest for a theory of universal grammar. Linguists
rely, in their theory development, not on undifferentiated
and unannotated data (sentences). Instead, universal the-
ories build on previous analyses of language: fragments
of grammar, or comparisons of particular constructions
across languages. A large amount of pre-theoretical sort-
ing out and dissecting of the data must occur before pro-
ceeding to highly abstract and over-arching theories of
language. The position taken here is that humour research
can usefully proceed in an analogous fashion (Figure 2).




Grammaticality Being a joke
Sentence type Subclass of jokes
Structural description Description of a joke
Grammar rule(s) Pattern for class of joke
Theory of grammar Theory of jokes
Theory of language use Theory of humour use
Figure 2: Analogy with linguistics
theory of (verbally expressed) humour, we must carry out
a significant amount of groundwork which involves ana-
lysing our primary data. Below, we make some sugges-
tions about how such descriptive work could proceed, with
some illustrative analyses of simple jokes.
3 What is an analysis?
The overall idea behind the framework here is simple: in
order to make clear and explicit the various factors that
contribute (or might contribute) towards the humorous ef-
fect of a piece of text, one should specify in some detail
the various abstract objects that are posited as underlying
the texts (e.g. symbolic representations of meaning), the
various properties that these objects have (e.g. denoting
a taboo subject) and the various interrelations which hold
between them (e.g. one meaning being more obvious than
another, one word sounding similar to another). An ana-
lysis of a joke is then a precise listing of this information
for the joke, at a suitable level of abstraction. This last
point is important: we have to rely (at least at this stage of
methodological development) on the intuition and judge-
ment of the analyst to propose abstract entities which are
relevant to the humorous effect, while ignoring irrelevant
details. For the moment, the assessment of the suitabil-
ity of the components of the joke analysis will be left to
the informed opinion of other humour researchers, but in
time we should evolve a more sophisticated methodology
in which independent criteria can be brought to bear. Ap-
pealing again to the analogy with generative linguistics,
when a syntactic rule is posited for a particular class of
sentences, there are various non-subjective criteria that
can be applied to argue for or against the adequacy or
elegance of the rule. In describing verbally expressed
humour, analogous criteria must be developed, for ex-
ample by arguing that the joke analysis offered will delin-
eate some natural class of jokes (cf. Ruch et al. (1993)).
Classes of joke can then be characterised by abstracting
from individual descriptions to form more general pat-
terns, in a manner analogous to creating grammar rules
which define the structure of classes of sentences.
4 Basic objects
We shall start from a few basic data types, and build from
there, introducing new primitives only as particular types
of joke seem to demand them.
Most discussions of jokes do not make it explicit what
their assumed primitive alphabet is. Since jokes are con-
veyed sometimes in speech and sometimes in writing, either
phonetics or orthography could be chosen. For many jokes,
the choice is immaterial. For some jokes, the spoken de-
livery is essential in order to create some form of ambigu-
ity. Only very rarely is it necessary to use a written form
in order to create the desired effect. In general, it is up
to the analyst to define which alphabet is to be the formal
representation for a joke, but here we shall assume that
there is such an alphabet, and that any string over that al-
phabet constitutes atext. That is, we will use the technical
term “text” to cover any sequence of symbols, whether a
complete joke (or well-formed sentence) or not. We shall
also assume that there is asimilarity measurewhich in-
dicates how similar two texts are, in some primitive sense.
(identity of texts will simply be identity within the set of
strings over the alphabet). This will be useful in analysing
jokes involving puns or ambiguity. It will then be possible
to define various kinds of near-equality relation between
texts, based on degrees of similarity (cf. the “paraphony”
and “hahaphony” of Dienhart (1999)).
Our initial set of object-types is then:
(a) ALPHABET: a set of basic symbols from which
jokes are (at the simplest level) made up; the ana-
lyst should make it clear whether written or spoken
symbols are intended.
(b) TEXT: a TEXT is a sequence of elements from the
chosen alphabet. Hence any substring of aTEXT is
a TEXT. There is asimilarity measurewhich indic-
ates how similar twoTEXTs are.
(c) MEANING: a MEANING is what might be termed
theliteral meaningorsemantic structureof aTEXT.
It takes no account of any inference or contextual
information which might flesh out or interpret the
meaning of the actual words used.
(d) INTERPRETATION: A TEXT may also have an as-
sociatedINTERPRETATION, which will be depend-
ent upon (but not identical to) theMEANING of the
TEXT (or its parts). It can be thought of as an in-
terrelated and consistent set of propositions, with
more content than the bareMEANINGs. This is in-
tended to be a broader kind of meaning (of a pas-
sage of text or of some sequence of events, for ex-
ample), which may involve much reasoning, filling
in of implicit information, unwarranted addition of
assumptions, etc.
(e) DESCRIPTION: This is a semantic structure which
encodes some attributes which could be true of an
entity; it candescribea MEANING.
These classes of object are primitive in the sense that
they are defined solely in terms of the relationships they
enter into with other primitive objects.MEANINGs, IN-
TERPRETATIONs andDESCRIPTIONs are allSEMANTIC
ITEMS, sometimes abbreviated below to “SemItem”. All
of the above entities are linguistic or abstract representa-
tional forms. There will also be entities denoting objects
or situations within some world (real or imaginary); see
Section 10 for two simple examples.
5 Properties and relations
In addition to some directly linguistic relationships between
our basic objects, there will be a large set of attributes
which are relevant to recording the humorous mechan-
isms within a joke. Thus our conceptual repertoire will
range from the relatively straightforward (e.g. oneTEXT
is a substring of another), through conventional linguistic
notions (e.g. aTEXT may have zero or moreMEANINGs),
to quite difficult and non-trivial properties (e.g. aMEAN-
ING is absurd, or anINTERPRETATION conveys a taboo
idea). This paper willnot attempt to give full and precise
definitions of these predicates, although we will provide
informal glosses of those which we use, in order to make
the examples intelligible. Supplying detailed definitions
for all the predicates involved in descriptions of jokes con-
stitutes a central and substantive part of developing a the-
ory of jokes, and thence a theory of humour (cf. (Ritchie,
1999, Section 4.5)). The first step in our methodology
is to postulate a range of these constructs, and see if we
can account for joke structure by using them consistently.
This decomposes the research into stages, with the fi-
nal definitions of these conceptual building blocks being
postponed until we have an idea of the set of primitives
that we need.
Two illustrative and typical examples might be as fol-
lows:
absurd(hSemItemi) : This is true ifhSemItemi, a
SEMANTIC ITEM, is in some way odd or bizarre.
conflicts(hMeaningi; hSemItemi) : hMeaningiwill
not merge withhSemItemi to form a coherentIN-
TERPRETATION.
6 Structural descriptions
To set out a description of the linguistic content of a joke,
we need to state exactly what abstract objects we are pos-
iting and what the relationships are between them. Many
authors have remarked on the way in which certain jokes
use the final line (punchline) to reveal an unexpected mean-
ing for the initial text, in a way that implies, evokes, or
describes an image that is odd in some way ((Raskin,
1985), (Attardo, 1994, Chapter 2), (Ritchie, 1999)). To
illustrate the descriptive approach here, we can borrow
this informal idea and state it in our terminology. (Notice
that the examples in this paper are mostly chosen for their
brevity and simplicity rather than the excellence of their
wit.)
(1) Why do birds fly south in winter?
It’s too far to walk.
The relevant workings of this joke could be summarised
thus:
There is aTEXT T = “Why do birds fly south
in winter? It’s too far to walk.” There are
subsequencesT1 = “Why do birds fly south
in winter?”,T2 = “It’s too far to walk”, and
MEANINGs M1, M2, M3 such thatM1 is a
moreobviousMEANING thanM2 for T1,M3
is the MEANING of T2, M3 conflicts with
M1 (or perhaps anINTERPRETATIONderived
from M1), M3 is compatible with M2, and
there is anINTERPRETATION I of M2+M3
which isabsurd.
(where words inbold font indicate properties or relations
which this description relies on).
7 Structural patterns
The above summary describes the content of one particu-
lar example joke. However, a necessary next step is to
abstract from such itemisations to create more general
patterns, which will describe classes of jokes which are
similar in their internal workings. Here we will call these
structural patterns. For the sake of a simple notation, we
will adopt a sorted version of first order predicate logic
(FOPL).
The above example can be seen as an instance of a
broader class characterised by the following (whereT is
the text of the joke):
9T1; T2 : text;M1;M2;M3 : meaning;
I : interpretation
such that
substrings(T; T1; T2) ^ meaning(T2;M3)
^ obviousmeaning(T1;M1;M2) ^
conflicts(M3;M1)^ compatible(M3;M2)^
form interpretation(M2;M3; I)^ absurd(I)
Here we have introduced further predicates:
obviousmeaning(hTexti; hSem1i; hSem2i) : This is true
if hSem1i is a more obvious interpretation ofhTexti
thanhSem2i.
compatible(hMeaningi; hSemItemi) : hMeaningi
can merge withhSemItemi to form a coherentIN-
TERPRETATION.
form interpretation(hSem1i; hSem2i; hSem3i) :
hSem1i merged withhSem2i formshSem3i.
8 Notation
Although we have adopted FOPL as our notation for ex-
pressing the information about a joke, this in no way im-
plies that the content of jokes is “logical” in any ordinary
sense of the word; the FOPL notation is merely acting
as our metalanguage: a convenient and concise way of
writing down statements which involve abstractobjects,
propertiesandrelations(see the summary of assumptions
in Section 12 below). The use of a logical representation
should facilitate the detection of classes and subclasses of
jokes, as such inclusions (or similarities) will be reflected
in logical expressions which subsume or overlap with one
another.
FOPL has its merits as a meta-notation, but it could
be rather verbose if used to state structural patterns in the
manner shown above. For example, the existence of sub-
strings has to be stated every time, and will not usually be
very complex, so it may not be necessary to have the full
expressive power of logic merely to state this information.
Also, patterns will always be of a form in which some
existentially quantified variables are introduced, and then
some constraints are placed on them. Moreover, there are
some recurring interrelations (e.g. that a meaning is as-
sociated with a particular stretch of text). Therefore, it
is worthwhile developing a more succinct and perspicu-
ous notation (which could in principle be expanded into
FOPL).
Firstly, we can indicate the segmentation of the text
into parts using brackets and subscripts:
[1Why do birds fly south in winter?]1
[2It’s too far to walk.]2
The subscripts can be used in terms indicating the vari-
ous objects involved, so thatM(1) is the MEANING of
TEXT labelled1 (which in turn is notated asT (1)). Where
there are more than one possibleMEANING for a par-
ticular TEXT T (N), these will be indicated byM(Na),
M(Nb), etc. AnINTERPRETATIONformed from theMEAN-
INGsM(1), . . .M(n) will be writtenI(1; : : : ; n). Also,
we can assume that all variables mentioned (or implicitly
used) in the logical expressions are existentially quanti-
fied. The properties of items, and relationships between
items, can still be written using the notation of FOPL. The




This has the merits of building the more basic lin-
guistic relations into the notation, thus rendering the more
substantive and humour-related predicates more promin-
ent. That is, the notation isnot being used to express in-
teresting theoretical claims (as is sometimes advocated in
early Chomskyan linguistics); instead, it is introduced to
push the less interesting structure into the background and
let the potentially significant predicates appear clearly.
To extend this notation to structural patterns as well
as descriptions of individual jokes, we can indicate the
decomposition of the text into substrings by a diagram
of labelled brackets showing the relative positioning of
the segments. That is, each pattern will have a “header”
which shows the shape of the text, numbering its subparts;
for example:
[1: : : ]1[2: : : ]2
indicates a text made up of two substrings. The above
example (1) is then an instance of the following pattern:




In this case, the application of the pattern to the specific
example is encoded entirely in the binding of the text seg-
ments 1, 2, etc.
9 Descriptive jokes
Some very brief examples may help to demonstrate the
approach advocated here. These make central use of the
DESCRIPTIONdata type introduced earlier.
(2) Why is coffee like the soil?
It is ground. (Pepicello and Green, 1984)
This example could be described as:
[1: : : ]1[2: : : ]2
compares(T (1);M;N) ^
yields description(M(2); D) ^
describes(D;M) ^ describes(D;N)
providing that we have the following predicates:
yields description(hMeaningi; hDescriptioni) : This
is true if thehDescriptioni can be extracted from
thehMeaningi.
describes(hDescriptioni; hMeaningi) : This is true if
hDescriptioni describeshMeaningi.
compares(hTexti; hMeaning1i; hMeaning2i) : This is
true if hTexti implies or states thathMeaning1i
andhMeaning2i are similar.
To describe example (3)
(3) What is grey, has four legs, and a trunk? A mouse
on vacation. (Rothbart, 1977)
we require the following predicate:
obviousdescription(hDesci; hMeaning1i; hMeaning2i)
: This is true if bothhMeaning1i andhMeaning2i
are described by theDESCRIPTIONhDesci, but this
is more obviously the case forhMeaning1i than
for hMeaning2i.
The structural pattern is then:
[1: : : ]1[2: : : ]2
yields description(M(1); D)^ absurd(M(2))
^ obviousdescription(D;M;M(2)))
Example (4)
(4) What do you call a strange market? A bizarre bazaar.
(Binsted, 1996)
can be described as:
[1: : : ]1[2[3: : :]3[4: : :]4]2
yields description(M(1); D) ^
describes(D;M(2))^ soundalike(T (3); T (4))
where the definition ofsoundalike can be based on the
similarity metric forTEXTs.
10 Narrative jokes
A large class of more complex jokes are those which rely
on narrative (i.e. “funny stories”). To describe the internal
workings of such jokes, particularly those which have a
“butt” or “target”, we need to introduce data-types denot-
ing entities (concrete or abstract) within the world of the
story. For the moment, we will restrict ourselves to an
EVENT-SEQUENCE, which aTEXT narrates, and a data-
typeCHARACTER for denotations of individuals within a
story.
For example, consider (5).
(5) Russian officers in an Eastern European country go
to a tavern. They order beer. The waiter places
coasters on the table and serves the beer. Later
they order another round. The waiter returning with
the beer finds no coasters. ‘OK,’ he tells himself,
‘these are collectors,’ and puts down another set
of coasters. When the third round is ordered and
brought out, there are again no coasters. Angry, the
waiter puts the beer down on the table, but places no
more coasters. One of the Russian officers protests:
‘What’s this? No more crackers?’ (Hetzron, 1991,
p.62)
This could be approximated with the pattern:
[1: : : ]1[2: : : ]2
narrates(T (1); E) ^
obviousinterpretation(E; I1) ^
conflicts(M(2); I1)^ adopts(I(2); C; I2; E)^
different(I1; I2) ^ absurd(I2)
assuming we use the following predicates:
narrates(hTexti; hEventsi) : hTexti recounts theEVENT-
SEQUENCEhEventsi.
obviousinterpretation(hEventsi; hInterpi) : The nat-
ural INTERPRETATIONfor hEventsi is theINTER-
PRETATION hInterpi.
adopts(hInterpAi; hChari; hInterpBi; hEventsi) : In
INTERPRETATIONhInterpAi, theCHARACTERhChari
adopts theINTERPRETATIONhInterpBi for hEventsi.
along with some notion of “distinctness” ofINTERPRET-
ATIONs.
This emphasises the difference betweenMEANINGs
andINTERPRETATIONs. The idea that the coasters have
been consumed by the soldiers, is part of theINTERPRET-
ATION of the narrative, although it is not stated as literal
meaning. Also, the idea (imputed to the soldiers) that the
coasters are crackers is an interpretation of the waiter’s
actions (within the world of the story), and is not a literal
meaning of any fragment of text.
Although the analyses given above suggests that the
relevant property of the soldiers’ interpretation is that it is
absurd, the pattern could perhaps be generalised to cover
more jokes in a fairly natural way. Consider (6), the cent-
ral example from Raskin (1985).
(6) ‘Is the doctor at home?’ the patient asked in his
bronchial whisper.‘No,’ the doctor’s young and pretty
wife whispered in reply.‘Come right in.’
This broadly follows the same pattern as (5). It could
be argued that the amusing interpretation adopted by the
character in this story is not so muchabsurd as taboo
(with its implication of adultery). We could generalise the
structural pattern by replacingabsurdwith inappropriate,
which we would define to be a disjunction ofabsurd,
taboo, and perhaps other properties found to render inter-
pretations amusing. Notice thatsomeproperty is essen-
tial, otherwise the stories would be simple tales of misun-
derstandings, with no humorous effect. Raskin argues (in
keeping with his semantic script-based theory of humour)
that in (6) the important ingredient is not located in the
mistaken interpretation alone, but in a form of compar-
ison (script opposition) with the more obvious and nat-
ural interpretation. If we were to accept this idea as being
a possible ingredient in making tales of misunderstand-
ing funny, then the last term in the above pattern could
be changed fromabsurd(I2) to (inappropriate(I2) _
contrast(I1; I2)) wherecontrast embodies the appro-
priate form of opposition.
(Notice that we have not yet covered the satirical or
mocking aspect of (5), as our structural patterns give no
indication that this joke casts a slur on Russian officers.
Such indirect or inferred content goes beyond the current
paper.)
It is interesting to see how this pattern can also cover
some apparently simpler jokes, such as (7) and (8).
(7) ‘Mr Fields, do you believe in clubs for young people?’
‘Only when kindness fails.’ (Shultz, 1976) and else-
where.
(8) A lady went into a clothing store and asked ‘May I
try on that dress in the window?’
‘Well,’ replied the sales clerk doubtfully, ‘don’t you
think it would be better to use the dressing room?’
(Oaks, 1994), citing from Clark (1968)
It might seem natural to focus on the fact that these
examples rely on linguistic ambiguity (lexical ambiguity
in (7), syntactic structural ambiguity in (8)), and to posit
a pattern such as:




However, this would miss a generalisation. In these
very short stories, the utterances attributed to specific char-
acters (the questioner in (7) and the lady in (8)) are in fact
events – linguistic in nature – which are being narrated,
and the ending of the joke involves some other charac-
ter imposing an interpretation on these linguistic events
which is not the obvious interpretation, and which is in-
appropriate in some way. Hence they both fall under the
more general pattern given for (5) (as amended to go bey-
ondabsurd in its last line). The linguistic ambiguity in
(7) and (8) is then viewed solely as a means to an end,
since it is the ambiguity which allows the different pos-
sible interpretations of the linguistic events.
Taking this perspective is different from some more
traditional humour analyses (cf. (Attardo, 1994, Chapter
2)), in which a major dividing line is drawn between jokes
which depend for their effect on the language in which
they are expressed (verbaljokes) and jokes which are more
easily translatable into other languages because the exact
phrasing is not crucial (referential jokes). In such a tax-
onomy, (7) and (8) would be verbal, while (5) and (6)
would be referential. That would obscure the generalisa-
tion, which we conjecture is a useful one, that all these
four stories share a common mechanism which is signi-
ficantly involved in their status as jokes.
11 Possible implementations
The work reported here is very preliminary, and does not,
at present, involve computational implementation. How-
ever, the emphasis on formalisation and detail is intended
to lead towards fuller symbolic models which could be
implemented and tested. There are various ways in which
this work could lead to implementation.
A rule tester. In the same way that a linguist could make
use of agrammar testing programto check their rules
(e.g. Friedman (1971)), software could be constructed to
apply rules to data (much as was done with the JAPE sys-
tem (Binsted et al., 1997)). If every output item is deemed
to be a joke (by a suitable set of human subjects), our
claim of sufficiency is met, and every non-joke output
counts as evidence against the sufficiency claim.
A joke understander. It is conceivable that a program
could be built which takes natural language input, and
rates each text as to its funniness, or (in terms of the
proposals here) its joke-hood. This would have the ad-
ded drawback that it would need an advanced natural lan-
guage analysis system with relatively wide coverage (which
is not easy to achieve at present). Also, there would be
methodological complications, given that the approach here
starts with subsets of jokes and gradually develops a de-
scription of a wider class of jokes. If such a system classes
a funny input as unfunny on the grounds that the item
does not conform to its rules, all we can conclude is that
our rules do not cover all possible jokes, but that was
already known. If it classed an unfunny input as funny,
this would refute the sufficiency of the rules, but this sug-
gests quite intricate testing in which we have to find po-
tential inputs which are not jokes (according to humans)
but which might be characterised by the system’s rules as
being funny,
A humorous program. It would be natural to jump to
the conclusion that computationally-oriented work on hu-
mour is aimed at producing, or might be used to produce,
an intelligent joke-telling and joke-appreciating software
agent. While this would be an impressive achievement,
it would, to work properly, require more than a theory of
joke structure. We would need a full theory of the use of
humour in context, which is not the immediate aim of the
descriptive work proposed here.
12 Moving towards a theory
The proposal here is that developing detailed descriptions
of subclasses of joke is a viable approach to building a
theory of what constitutes a humorous stimulus, (or at
least a verbally expressed one). Theoretical progress will
come gradually by finding generalisations across the vari-
ous classes, and perhaps constructing a hierarchy of classes
and subclasses. Such a taxonomy, based on systematic ac-
counts of the mechanisms of jokes, would be more inter-
esting than a simple classification of jokes into categories.
Also, the explicit itemisation, within structural patterns,
of the necessary properties and relationships will clarify
what concepts have to be explicated as part of a fuller the-
ory. Theoretical work can proceed by developing defini-
tions of these predicates; in particularly, the frequently
proposed concept ofincongruitycould be dissected in this
way.
It may also be possible to discover some internal struc-
turing within the structural patterns themselves. It may be
that the conditions summarised in a structural pattern are
of a few different sorts, some of which are more directly
“structural” (e.g.obviousmeaning,yields description),
with others being more concerned with the properties of
interpretations that render them amusing (e.g.absurd).
At the present stage of development, this is still vague
speculation.
Developing a range of structural patterns for jokes
will provide, at any stage of the ongoing work, aprovi-
sional theory in which a text is claimed to be a jokeif it
falls into one of the classes described; that is, the interim
theory will offer a sufficient condition for joke-hood, but
not (until it is complete) a necessary condition. Even if
complete in this sense, it wouldnot be a theory ofhu-
mour. In the same way that a theory of grammar would
not be a full theory of language (since it would not cover
issues such as language use), a theory of joke structure
would be just one step towards a broader theory.
The framework set out so far does, as mentioned in
Section 1, implicitly adopt some theoretical positions. Some
of the more basic of these are as follows:
(a) It is reasonable to posit abstract linguistic objects
such as “meanings”, and relationships such as “more
obvious than” to represent the linguistic content of
a text.
(b) There are properties of, and relationships between,
these objects, such as “absurd”, which can be defined
simply in terms of the abstract objects themselves
(i.e. without contextual information).
(c) If a suitable set of these primitives can be developed,
then it will be possible to define, solely in terms of
these concepts, subclasses of texts which constitute
jokes.
(d) The status of a text as a joke can be determined
from the text itself in isolation (in contrast to the
funniness of the joke, which might be dependent
on various more complex factors such as context,
timing, hearer’s sense of humour, etc.).
(e) The status of a text as a joke is relevant to its use or
potential use in a humorous way; that is, a theory of
the structure of jokes in isolation is a contribution
to building a broader theory of humour.
These are very minimal theoretical claims, and leave
open many decisions about the nature of joke structure.
This is, at the current stage, desirable. The approach ad-
vocated here requires further empirical study in order to
develop some substantive theoretical proposals which are
based on the evidence. In that way, some general progress
should come about.
Another essential development will be some criteria
to guide and restrict the introduction and use of data-types
and relationships, as the descriptive exercise is rather un-
constrained otherwise. As noted in Section 3, there is an
analogy with descriptive linguistics, in which guidelines
have evolved for comparing one putative analysis with an-
other.
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